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NLRB TREATMENT OF PERSONNEL
UNDER THE NLRA
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)1 protects workers
who qualify as employees2 under the Act by guaranteeing employees the
right to organize and bargain collectively.' The Supreme Court has
recognized that the definition of "employee" is broad because Congress
intended the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)4 to inter-
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Congress enacted the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or Act) in 1935. Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Congress passed the Act to eliminate
inequality of bargaining power between labor and management in an effort to minimize in-
dustrial strife. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). In 1947, Congress expanded and amended the
NLRA by enacting the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Taft-Hartley Act, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Title
I of the LMRA encompasses 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and continues to be
called the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 167 (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Section 2(3) of the Act defines "employee" as any employee
and does not limit the term to employees of a particular employer. National Labor Relations
Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The Act expressly excludes from the definition of
employee any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, as a domestic servant, or as a
supervisor. Id. The Act also excludes from coverage any individual with status as an in-
dependent contractor or employed by a parent or spouse. Id. Furthermore, the Act excludes
employees of employers subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980), and employees of persons outside the scope of the Act's definition of
employer. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The NLRA expressly
excludes from the meaning of "employer" the United States government, any state or local
government, persons subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980), and any labor organization. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1976). The Wagner Act contained a definition of "employee" at section 2(3) and the
Taft-Hartley Act amended the definition. Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450
(1935), amended by Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)). Congress has not amended section 2(3) in relevant part
since enacting the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); see supra note 1 (history of
NLRA).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1976). Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the right
to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities or to refrain from such
activities. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The Act further provides
at section 8(a)(1) that an employer's interference with employees' rights to organize, bargain
collectively, and engage in concerted activity under section 7 constitutes an unfair labor
practice. Id. § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Concerted activities include strikes, pickets, and
other activities in which employees participate for their mutual aid or protection. See 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND.
L.J. 319 (1951).
' See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1976). Congress established the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) as the administrative agency responsible for enforcement of the
Act. Id. The Board consists of five members appointed by the President who serve stag-
gered terms of five years each. Id. § 153(a). Congress empowered the Board to establish the
rules necessary to administer the Act. Id. § 156. The Act authorizes the Board to hold hear-
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pret and apply the definition5 in accordance with the congressional
policy of promoting collective bargaining in labor-management
ings and elections regarding union representation and to prevent and remedy unfair labor
practices. Id. §§ 159, 160.
In an unfair labor practice case, the General Counsel staff of the NLRB investigates the
practice and determines if the particular charge warrants issuance of a complaint. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (1976); see Regulations Relating to Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 100.735-2(b), 101.2-101.16
(1982). At the close of the investigation, the Regional Director either recommends
withdrawal of charges, dismisses the case, attempts settlement, enters an order, or initiates
formal proceedings by filing a complaint specifying alleged violations of the NLRA. Id.
.§§ 101.5-101.9 (1982). The matter proceeds to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(AL), and the hearing, so far as practicable, adheres to the rules of procedure for the
federal district courts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1982). The ALJ files with
the NLRB a decision of proposed findings of fact and recommendations. 29 C.F.R. § 101.11
(1982). After each party has an opportunity to file exceptions, the NLRB decides the case in
light of the entire record. Id. § 101.12. Either by a panel of three Board members or by the
entire Board, the NLRB issues an order. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 101.12 (1982).
The Board has no inherent enforcement power but may petition an appropriate federal
court of appeals for enforcement of any NLRB order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.14 (1982). Furthermore, any person aggrieved may petition an appropriate court of ap-
peals for relief from a Board order, and the Act provides the petitioner a choice of venue. 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976); see 29 C.F.R. § 101.14 (1982).
In addition to granting the Board authority to prevent and remedy unfair labor prac-
tices, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976), Congress empowered the Board to conduct representation elec-
tions for collective bargaining and sets forth procedures by which the Board conducts elec-
tions and certifies bargaining representatives. Id. § 159. Additionally, the Act gives the
Board broad discretion to determine an appropriate unit for collective bargaining and
decide which employees properly belong in the unit. Id. § 159(b).
The Act sets a standard of judicial review whereby NLRB findings of fact are con-
clusive "if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." Id.
§ 160(e)-(f); see NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951); see also infra note 8 (judicial review of Board decisions).
I See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 119 (1944) (newsboys were
employees covered by NLRA rather than independent contractors excluded from protec-
tion). Although Congress later repudiated the Hearst finding of employee status, see infra
note 53 (Hearst discussed), the Supreme Court continues to recognize the Hearst approach
of allowing the NLRB to interpret and apply the Act in accordance with the NLRA goal of
promoting collective bargaining. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971). The Court has limited the Board's power to interpret the
definition of employee by restricting the definition to an individual who currently works for
another for hire. See Allied Chem., 404 U.S. at 166 (Court refused to extend definition of
employee to include retired workers); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (definition of employee); see
also infra note 7 (Board authority to formulate policies to implement Act).
The Supreme Court upholds NLRB determinations of employee status when the facts
and law are sufficient to justify the finding. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S.
416, 431 (1947). The Court gives the Board broad discretion to determine if employees form
an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. Id. at 422; see 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976); see also
supra note 4 (bargaining units). The Board distinguishes between employees who qualify
under the NLRA definition and employees who possess the mutuality of employment in-
terests necessary to form an appropriate collective bargaining unit. See New York Univ.,
205 N.L.R.B. 4, 5-8 (1973) (part-time faculty members were employees but excluded from
bargaining unit comprised of full-time employees because groups lacked necessary mutuality
of interest).
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relations.6 Congress empowered the Board to enforce the Act and for-
mulate policies necessary to administer the Act.7 Furthermore, Congress
outlined the role of the courts as policing bodies but limited the courts'
' See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Congress declared the purpose of the Act to be the promo-
tion of the free flow of commerce through the encouragement of employee organization and
collective bargaining. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935,
at 1099 (1949) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1184]; H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT, 1935, at 2910 (1935) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 969]. Writing for the House
Committee on Labor, Representative Connery outlined the three goals of the House version
of the bill. H.R. REP. No. 969 at 6; see H.R. 7978, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2857 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as" H.R. 7978]. The bill should promote equal bargaining power between
labor and management, reduce causes of disputes in labor relations, and create enforcement
mechanisms necessary in resolution of labor disputes. H.R. REP. No. 969 at 6.
1 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-95 (1941). The Supreme Court
has approved Board formulation of policies and implementation of procedures to carry out
the purposes of the NLRA. Id. at 192-95. When the Board acts reasonably within the pur-
poses and goals of the Act, courts generally defer to the procedures and policies the Board
outlines. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 10-18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. GORMAN]. When the literal provisions
of the Act would undermine NLRA objectives, the Board must recognize the objectives and
tailor Board action accordingly. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir.
1974).
A problem arises from the Board's ability to formulate policy because the Board's
membership changes from year to year. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976); see also supra note 4
(explanation of Board procedures). A striking example of policy changes due to changes in
NLRB membership is in the area of regulation of representation elections. The 1982 case of
Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. represents the Board's fourth position on a single issue. 263
N.L.R.B. No. 24, -, 110 L.R.R.M. 1489, 1494 (1982). In Midland the NLRB held that the
Board would no longer regulate the truth and falsity of campaign propaganda, leaving judg-
ment of campaign misrepresentations by union or employer to the employees. Id. at __ ,
110 L.R.R.M. at 1493. In the first decision of the issue, the Board announced a policy of
screening campaign representations. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
With a change in membership, however, came a change in policy, and the Board reversed
the Hollywood Ceramics rule, leaving interpretations of validity of representations entirely
to the employees. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1312-13 (1977). But
with another change in membership, the Board reversed Shopping Kart and returned to the
Hollywood Ceramics standard. General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619,623 (1978); see generally
A. Cox, D. Box, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 159-161 (9th ed. 1981).
The Midland case in turn rejected the General Knit approach and returned to the Shopping
Kart rule by which the Board will not police election campaigns to the extent of determining
the validity of campaign representations. 263 N.L.R.B. at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1494.
Midland illustrates the Board's latitude in formulating policies to implement the Act.
Practicing labor lawyers have expressed concern over the Board's tendency to change
policies, calling for the NLRB to develop consistent and predictable guidelines. See Kelly &
Fraser, NLRB Preelection Standards Deemed Inconsistent, Legal Times, Oct. 11, 1982, at
14, col. 1. Congress likewise has looked critically at the Board's policy-making ability, con-
ducting hearings with respect to the NLRB's role in creating legislation as an ad-
ministrative agency. See generally Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies
[NLRB): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the
Judiciary U.S. Sen., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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ability to overturn NLRB action to situations in which the record as a
whole does not support Board decisions8 or in which Board policies do
not have a reasonable basis in the Act.' Over the years, the NLRB has
used the deference Congress granted to define the extent of protection
workers receive under the Act." The Board expands or retracts protec-
tion of workers through interpretation of the Act or through common-
law exceptions to the Act's provisions.11 Board determinations define
NLRA protection and are invalid only when Congress or the courts find
that the NLRB overstepped the authority which Congress vested in the
Board."
The Act expressly excludes agricultural laborers and independent
contractors from employee status and the resulting NLRA protections. 3
In addition, the Board and courts have developed a common-law exclu-
sion for managerial employees. 4 Because Congress intended passage of
the NLRA to promote equality of bargaining power, 5 the Supreme
Court has agreed with the Board's determination that allowing
managerial employees to have status as employees under the Act de-
feats Congress' avowed purpose. 8 The Board uses similar reasoning to
exclude confidential employees from certain protection afforded
employees although confidential employees do fall within the NLRA
definition of employee. 7 Since access to confidential information of the
employer in the area of labor relations would give a bargaining unit un-
fair advantage in the bargaining process, the Board excludes confiden-
a See supra note 4 (discussion of standards of judicial review of Board decisions). The
Universal Camera and NLRA mandate of court deference to Board decisions based on
substantial evidence on the record as a whole applies to findings of fact. Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1976). Furthermore, when
the Board has a choice between two fairly conflicting views, each supported by evidence,
the Supreme Court requires appellate courts to adhere to the Board's finding. NLRB v.
United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968).
' See supra note 7 (court deference to Board formulations of policies with reasonable
basis in NLRA).
"o See infra notes 19-70 and accompanying text (interpretation of employee status of
agricultural workers and independent contractors).
" See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text (narrow interpretation of agricultural
exclusion); infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text (independent contractors excluded); in-
fra notes 72-89 (common-law exclusion of managerial employees); infra notes 106-12 (limited
protection of supervisors normally excluded); infra notes 153-56 (retracted protection of con-
fidential employees).
" See infra notes 78-79 (Board formulates policies but courts reject policies that over-
reach purposes of Act); see also supra note 7 (Board ability to determine policies).
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see also supra note 2 (definition of employee).
" NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); see infra notes 72-77 & 79-82
and accompanying text (judicial exclusion of managerial employees from NLRA coverage).
" See supra note 6 (purpose of Act).
"s See infra notes 75 & 79-82 and accompanying text (exclusion of managerial
employees adheres to purpose of Act).
17 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 178 (1981).
In Hendricks the Supreme Court rejected dictum of the Bell Aerospace Court which sug-
gested that confidential employees are outside the consideration of the Act. 454 U.S. at 188;
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tial employees with a labor connection from bargaining units of rank-
and-file employees.18
Congress excluded agricultural laborers from the 1935 NLRA (Wag-
ner Act).19 The reason for the exclusion is not clear from the NLRA
legislative history." In the draft legislation before the houses of Con-
gress, two separate opinions emerged regarding agricultural employees.
The Senate viewed as appropriate an exclusion for small-scale farm
laborers analogous to the exclusion for domestic and family
employment.2' The Senate rationale noted that the small size of farm
operations and the minimal effect of agriculture on interstate commerce
justified exclusion of the workers.' The House, however, apparently
disregarded the impact of large-scale farm operations on interstate com-
merce and viewed the agricultural exclusion as applicable even to large
groups of laborers comparable to industrial groups.' The House version
of the intent statement prevailed.24
see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 n.12 (1974). The Act itself does not ex-
clude confidential employees from NLRA protection. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see also
infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (gendricks discussed).
11 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 185 (1981);
see infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (exclusion of confidential employees from
bargaining units); see also supra note 4 (Board authority to determine appropriate bargain-
ing unit).
19 Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
152(3) (1976)).
2 See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 13; Dyson, The Farm Workers and the N.L.R.A.:
From Wagner to Taft-Hartley, 36 FED. B.J. 121, 121-22 (1977); Morris, Agricultural Labor
and National Labor Legislation, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1939, 1951-56 (1966). In the original pro-
posed version of the Wagner Act, the definition of employee was simply "any individual
employed by an employer under any contract for hire." S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(3), 78
CONG. REc. 3443, 3444 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1 (1949). When the bill returned from committee, the accom-
panying report indicated without explanation that the bill excluded agricultural laborers. S.
REP. No. 1184, supra note 6, at 1; see Morris, supra, at 1952 n.59.
21 S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 6, at 3; see supra note 2 (exclusions from definition of
employee). The Senate report accompanying the Senate bill S. 2926, supra note 20, explained
that the labor board would hear only disputes of a certain magnitude with an effect on in-
terstate commerce, S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 6, at 3; see also Dyson, supra note 20, at
121-22 (discussion of Senate intent).
22See S. REP. No. 1184, supra note 6, at 3; see Dyson, supra note 20, at 122 (legislative
history of agricultural exclusion).
I See H.R. REP. No. 969, supra note 6, at 27-28 (minority view). The minority report
from the House Committee on Labor revealed the House attitude that "agricultural
laborer" referred to workers on large-scale farms. Id. at 27. In urging that the Act should
protect agricultural workers, the minority report cited instances of poor working condi-
tions, worker exploitation, and the need for worker organization in certain intensely
agricultural areas. Id. Though the House bill, H.R. 7978, supra note 6, excluded agricultural
laborers altogether, the minority view indicated that the House did not identify the
agricultural laborer as a small-scale farm hand. Id. at 27-28; see also Dyson, supra note 20, at
122 (discussion of legislative history of agricultural exclusion); Uchtmann and Bertagnolli,
The Coverage of the Agricultural Worker in Labor Legislation: Deviations from the Norm,
2 AGRIC. L.J. 606, 612 (1981) (legislative history of agricultural exclusion).
24 See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 31. Commentators have propounded various
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The agricultural labor exclusion required the NLRB to determine
whether workers were agricultural laborers or employees under the
Act.' The Board generally construed the exclusion narrowly and found
workers to be employees." Agriculture and industry often overlapped,'
so the Board and courts determined the status of workers by applying a
"nature of the work" test.' Although the NLRB did not always adhere to
theories for Congress' exclusion of the agricultural laborer from the Act's protection. One
commentator noted that the exclusion represented congressional concessions to agricultural
business leaders who resisted having agriculture regulated by the Wagner Act, the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), or the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), all of which were before Congress in 1935.
R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 31; see Note, Agricultural Labor Relations- The Other Farm
Problem, 14 STAN. L. REV. 120, 127-28 (1961) (discussion of agriculture exclusion from
NLRA). A common theory is that the local nature of agriculture prevents agricultural work
from falling within Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. R. GORMAN, supra
note 7, at 31; see Dyson, supra note 20, at 122; Morris, supra note 20, at 1979. Another possi-
ble explanation of the exception is that the perishability of crops and the limited production
season precluded inclusion of agriculture in a dispute resolution system that involves delay
through collective bargaining between employees and management and through NLRB pro-
ceedings. R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 31-32; Dyson, supra note 20, at 128. Congress also may
have believed that the more intimate relationship between employer and employee in
agriculture diminished the need for collective bargaining. R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 32;
see North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir. 1940), enforcing,
10 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1939). Other commentators state that Congress omitted agricultural
laborers from the scope of the NLRA because agricultural unions failed to send represent-
atives to testify that the Act should protect agricultural workers. See Dyson, supra note 20,
at 125; Morris, supra note 20, at 1956.
' See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (definition of employee).
26 See, e.g., Indiana Mushroom Corp., 60 N.L.R.B. 1065, 1068 (1945) (agricultural work
must involve cultivation of soil, harvesting of crops, or management of livestock); American
Fruit Growers, Inc., 10 N.L.R.B. 316, 329 (1938) (lettuce packing and shipping is incident to a
commercial enterprise and not agricultural labor because packers did not work in fields).
See Tovrea Packing Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1068 n.4 (1939), enforced, 111 F.2d 626
(9th Cir. 1940); see Dyson, supra note 20, at 132 (industrial nature of agriculture); Uchtmann
and Bertagnolli, supra note 23, at 612 (agriculture as business). American Fruit Growers
demonstrates the difficulty the Board has in distinguishing between agriculture and in-
dustry. See 10 N.L.R.B. 316 (1938). In American Fruit Growers, the Board examined the
status of farm workers who handled and packed produce after other workers harvested the
produce in the field. Id. at 320. Although the record clearly indicated that each worker's
employment involved the handling of products grown on a farm, the NLRB found only field
workers were agricultural laborers outside the purview of the Act. Id. at 329. The Board
found that packing and shipping of produce was commercial in nature and workers involved
in the process were employees the Act protected. Id.
' See North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir. 1940),
enforcing, 10 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1939). In North Whittier, the Ninth Circuit squarely addressed
the question of whether packing house workers were agricultural laborers. 109 F.2d at 80.
The court adopted a test based on the nature of the work modified by the method of doing
the work. Id. The North Whittier court found that when the manner of handling produce
changed from harvesting to packing, the status of the work involved in the activities also
changed. Id. The work of the packing house constituted an industry quite distinct from
agricultural tasks. Id. at 80-81. Thus, the court found that packing house employees were
employees whose rights the Act protected. Id. at 81.
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the standard," the Board distinguished agricultural laborers from
employees protected by the Act according to the nature of the work test
for several years."
In 1946, Congress answered complaints from agricultural leaders31
by directing the Board to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)2
definition of agricultural laborer.3 The Board adopted the FLSA test
and began resolving the status question on the basis of whether the
specific work related primarily to agriculture or to industry.' Although
application of the FLSA definition yielded results inconsistent with the
Board's earlier determinations in some situations," the Board continues
to construe the agricultural exclusion narrowly to provide protection to
the maximum number of agricultural workers. 6
' See, e.g., Tovrea Packing Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1939), enforced, 111 F.2d 626 (9th
Cir. 1940). In Tovrea, the NLRB and the Ninth Circuit departed from the nature of the work
test. 12 N.L.R.B. at 1068; see supra note 28 (nature of the work test). The Board established
a two-part test to determine whether an employee was an agricultural laborer. 12 N.L.R.B.
at 1068. The Board held that an agricultural laborer is one who works for the owner or ten-
ant of a farm that produces products in the raw state and one who engages in work that is
incident to ordinary farming operations rather than manufacturing or commercial opera-
tions. Id. In Tovrea, a "ranch" that consisted only of a feed lot and slaughter house for
livestock did not produce agricultural products in the raw state and the employees,
therefore, were not agricultural laborers. Id.
I See, e.g., Robert Hind, Ltd., 58 N.L.R.B. 99, 100-01 (1944) (employees who bottled
milk at a location separate from the milking operation were employees under Act because
preparation of milk for shipment to market is commercial rather than agricultural in
character); Saticoy Lemon Ass'n, 41 N.L.R.B. 243, 247 (1942) (picking lemons was
agricultural task because workers harvested lemons directly from trees); Stark Bros.
Nurseries & Orchards, 40 N.L.R.B. 1243, 1251 (1942) (nursery workers were agricultural
laborers because character of work was essentially that of growing crops).
s, Dyson, supra note 20, at 121-22 (legislative history of agricultural exclusion discussed).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Congress enacted the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to establish minimum wages, to require payment for overtime
hours, and to regulate child labor. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212 (1976).
3 Bayside Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 300 (1977); see 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (1976).
The definition of agriculture under the FLSA includes cultivating, harvesting, dairying,
raising agricultural or horticultural commodities, raising livestock and poultry, and doing
other tasks of a farmer or person on a farm incident to farming operations. 29 U.S.C. § 203(f)
(1976). The Supreme Court analyzed the FLSA definition as having two distinct parts.
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1949). The Court
stated that typical farming activities such as cultivation, tilling, and dairying make up the
primary meaning but that a second broader meaning of farming activities includes opera-
tions performed incidentally to or in connection with farm operations by a farm worker. Id.
' Di Giogio Fruit Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 853, 856 (1948). The NLRB adhered to Congress'
directive and concluded that under the FLSA definition of agriculture workers engaged in
alteration of farm products by canning or processing in order to increase the value of the
products are not agricultural. Id. Conversely, those who engage in operations other than
field labor but incidental to ordinary farm operations are agricultural workers. Id.; see John
C. Maurer & Sons, 127 N.L.R.B. 1459, 1460 (1960) (packing-shed workers who packed celery
that employer grew were agricultural laborers).
See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 33 (discussion of differing results).
See, e.g., Shoenberg Farms, 129 N.L.R.B. 966, 966 (1960) (employer's business, in
1983]
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In many areas of the nation, agricultural labor is industrial in nature
and agriculture is a major business enterprise with great impact on in-
terstate commerce." As the Act's legislative history indicates, agricul-
tural labor may involve small-scale farm operations similar to domestic
or family work or may be highly developed large-scale business opera-
tions that reach interstate commerce.' In the latter case, Congress fell
short of accomplishing the purposes of the NLRA by excluding
agricultural laborers from the Act's protections. 9 Since the Act seeks to
promote the free flow of commerce and reduce labor disputes through
bargaining between labor and management,4" Congress clearly could
have included in the definition of employee workers on large-scale farms
that affect interstate commerce.41 Instead of excluding all farm workers
from the Act's definition of employee, Congress should have extended
the definition to include agricultural laborers on large-scale farms. The
Act purports to promote interstate commerce by eliminating labor rela-
tions problems and resolving labor disputes, but exclusion of
agricultural workers defeats each goal because agricultural laborers are
workers the Act should protect and agricultural labor relations prob-
lems are often analogous to industrial labor relations disputes.42 Four
which farm served as locale for commercial processing of dairy products, was not
agricultural though some operations would have been agricultural standing alone), enforced,
297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961); The Valley of Virginia Coop. Milk Producers Ass'n, 127
N.L.R.B. 785, 786 (1960) (bulk tank drivers who transported milk from farms to employer's
processing plant but who neither worked on a farm nor for a farmer were not agricultural
laborers); Michigan Peat, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 518, 519 (1960) (harvesting of peat moss was
harvesting of wild commodity rather than agricultural commodity, therefore, employees
were not agricultural laborers excluded from Act); The Illinois Canning Co., 125 N.L.R.B.
699, 700 (1959) (employees who maintained farm equipment furnished by employer to other
farmers under contract did not perform labor incidental to employer's own farming opera-
tions and thus were not agricultural laborers). The Board has determined that the Act en-
titles workers who do both agricultural and nonagricultural work to protection to the extent
that the workers are not agricultural laborers. Olaa Sugar Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1442, 1443
(1957) (Act protected farm employees who regularly performed some nonagricultural work
with respect to nonagricultural portion of work); see NLRB v. C & D Foods, Inc., 626 F.2d
578, 581 (7th Cir. 1980) (employees ordinarily thought to be agricultural laborers who per-
form certain nonagricultural work not excluded as agricultural laborers); Waldo Rohnert
Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 152, 154 (1958) (employees covered by Act to extent of nonagricultural
work).
" See H.R. REP. No. 969, supra note 6, at 27-28 (minority view) (in certain intensely
agricultural areas working conditions resemble conditions in industrial settings and warrant
NLRA coverage); see also supra note 23 (minority view of report).
' See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (legislative history of NLRA exclusion
of agricultural laborers).
" See supra note 6 (purpose of Act).
10 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (declaration of policy of NLRA); see supra note 6 (purpose of
Act).
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (agricultural laborers excluded from definition of
employee).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (declaration of policy of NLRA); see also supra note 6 (pur-
pose of Act).
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states have recognized the void in protection afforded farm workers who
wish to engage in concerted activity" by adopting comprehensive
agricultural labor relations legislation analogous to the NLRA but
designed to provide for collective bargaining and grievance arbitration
for agricultural laborers.44 State legislation of labor relations in the area
of agriculture is necessary because of congressional inattention to the,
needs of agricultural laborers.
4 5
Unlike agricultural laborers, Congress did not exempt independent
contractors expressly from the reach of the 1935 Wagner Act.46 The
NLRB, however, consistently excluded independent contractors from
the Act's protections and privileges. The Board struggled with deter-
minations of whether a person was an independent contractor or an
employee48 and used two distinct theories for finding a worker an
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (definition of employee, which excludes agricultural
laborers); supra note 3 (concerted activity defined).
" See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1381 to -1395 (Supp. 1982); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-
1166 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 22-4102 to -4113 (1977 & Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN., §§ 44-818 to -831 (1981). The goals of the state agricultural labor acts are to promote
organization, concerted activity, and collective bargaining among agricultural laborers that
the NLRA excludes. See Uchtmann and Bertagnolli, supra note 23, at 613-14 (discussion of
state legislation).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (exclusion of agricultural laborers from Act coverage).
" Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1976)).
" See, e.g., Philadelphia Record Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1240 (1946) (distributors were
independent contractors excluded from Act's protection); W & W Fruit Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 164,
166 (1945) (box contractor was independent contractor excluded from bargaining unit); East
Shore Newspapers, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 993, 995 (1944) (correspondents excluded from Act
coverage because independent contractors); Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850, 852 (1943)
(trucker protected because employee not independent contractor); The Kelly Co., 34
N.L.R.B. 325, 329 (1941) (truckers who were independent contractors were excluded from
Act's protection).
See, e.g., Philadelphia Record Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1239-40 (1946); Consolidation
Coal Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 169, 173 (1945); The Kelly Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 325, 329 (1941). In
Philadelphia Record, the Board found some characteristics of an employment relationship
between the company and newspaper carriers and other characteristics supporting
independent contractor status. 69 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40. The Board resolved the conflict be-
tween the two possible relationships by finding that the facts supporting status as indepen-
dent contractors outweighed the evidence of an employment relationship. Id. at 1240.
In Kelly, the Board found two truckers to be employees and three to be independent
contractors. 34 N.L.R.B. at 328-29. The Board identified two truckers as employees because
the men were subject to company direction at all times and received weekly wages from the
company payroll and Christmas gifts. Id. The Board found three other truckers to be in-
dependent contractors and excluded the men from the bargaining unit because the truckers
were partners, owned the trucks used in the enterprise, and worked for other companies.
Id. at 329. Furthermore, the company did not list the truckers found to be independent con-
tractors on the payroll but paid the truckers weekly according to the amount of hauling
completed. Id.
In Consolidation Coal, the Board held the company's barbers to be employees, 63
N.L.R.B. at 174, although the company paid the barbers on a commission basis. Id. at 173.
Crucial to the determination was the fact that the company hired and fired the barbers in
the same way the company hired and fired other employees. Id.
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employee.49 The Board used the "right to control" test 0 in some in-
stances to determine if a master-servant relationship existed.5 In other
situations, however, the Board found employee status when the Board
viewed the relationship between the employer and alleged employee as
creating an economic condition that Congress intended the Act to
reach.2 Although the approach extended employee status to personnel
otherwise deemed independent contractors, the Supreme Court sustained
the Board's "purpose of the Act" approach in the determination of
employee status."
Congress reacted to the expansive interpretation of the NLRB and
R9 . GORMAN, supra note 7, at 29-30 (Board tests for employee status).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957). Among the factors considered
under the common-law agency right to control test in distinguishing between servant and
independent contractor status are the extent of control the master exercises over the
details of the work, the skill required in the task, the duration of the employment, the
method of payment, and the intent of the parties. Id. Also important are whether the party
employed works in a distinct business, whether an employer usually supervises the kind of
work, and whether the work is part of the employer's ordinary business. Id.
SI See, e.g., Klement Timber Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 681, 683 (1944) (Board applied the control
test and found sawmill workers and loggers employees); Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850,
852 (1943) (trucker who owned truck and drove regularly for company under contract was
not independent contractor since company had control over tenure and terms and conditions
of employment); Theurer Wagon Works, Inc., 18 N.L.R.B. 837, 870 (1939) (employee who did
pictorial and lettering work for company and other businesses was independent contractor
because company exercised no control over worker).
'" Stockholders Publishing Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1022-23 (1941). The Board examined
the status of newsboys for Los Angeles newspaper distributors and found the newsboys
employees of the publishers. Id. at 1022-23. Although the Board noted the presence of
employer control and direction over the manner and means of distribution, the Board went
beyond the right to control test in making the determination of employee status. Id. at
1022-23. The Board explained that the primary consideration in determining employee
status was whether furtherance of NLRA policies mandated a determination that Congress
intended the Act to protect the newsboys. Id. at n.33. In Stockholders, the Board found that
the companies hired newsboys by assignment of sales areas, furnished equipment to be used
in sales, required attendance at specific hours, controlled supply, fixed earnings by fixing
prices, supervised the manner of sale, and discharged or transferred newsboys at will. Id. at
1023. Although the companies did not carry the newsboys on the companies' payrolls, the
newsboys were an indispensible part of the distribution system. Id. The Board held that the
newsboys were the type of personnel the NLRA policies and goals contemplated protecting.
Id. at 1023 n.33, 1024; see also Hearst Publications, Inc., and The Times-Mirror Co., 39
N.L.R.B. 1245 (1942), and Hearst Publications, Inc., and Stockholders Publishing Co., 39
N.L.R.B. 1256 (1942), affd, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (Board determinations of status of similar
employees of same companies).
I NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132 (1944). The Supreme Court af-
firmed the NLRB decision in Hearst to reject the common-law control test and substitute a
determination of whether the policies and goals of the NLRA warranted inclusion of
newsboys within the definition of employee. Id. at 124-25. The Hearst newsboys worked con-
tinuously and regularly, with newspaper prices and supply fixed by the publisher and the
hours of work prescribed and supervised. Id. at 131. The Court, therefore, determined that
the Board finding that newsboys were employees had reasonable basis in law. Id. at 132; see
supra note 7 (deference to Board policies).
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the Supreme Court by amending the Act to exclude independent con-
tractors from NLRA coverage" and directing that the common-law con-
trol test be the standard.5 The Board now applies the right to control
test,' considering factors such as the alleged employer's control over the
manner and means of accomplishing the task," hours of work,5 and
method of payment,"9 as well as the employer's regulation of the alleged
employee's participation in outside enterprises6 and the employer's
assumption of risks of loss. 1 Whether a person is an employee or an in-
" Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 153(3) (1976)); see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 245].
61 H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 18. Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's re-
jection of the common-law right to control test in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944), by amending section 152(3) to exclude independent contractors. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1976). The House Report expressed Congress' intent that courts apply the common-
law control test to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent con-
tractor. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 18. The report presumed that by enacting the
NLRA Congress intended that the statutory language be interpreted according to ordinary
meanings rather than meanings the NLRB might create. Id.
W See, e.g., NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1981)
(employer authority to control work required determination of employee status); NLRB v.
Tri-State Transp. Corp., 649 F.2d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1981) (court applied right to control test,
overturned Board evaluation of employment relationship, and held driver to be independent
contractor); Waggoner v. Northwest Excavating, Inc., 642 F.2d 333, 337 (9th Cir. 1981)
(owner-operators were independent contractors since employer's only control was providing
time cards for recording of hours worked), vacated, 102 S.Ct. 1417. (1982); Standard Oil Co.,
230 N.L.R.B. 967, 968 (1977) (employer control of manner and means of job performance
determinative of status as employee); George Transfer & Rigging Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 494, 496
(1974) (control by employer extended only to results sought, therefore no employment rela-
tionship); see also supra note 50 (common-law right to control test).
El Mundo, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 760, 761 (1967) (newspaper carriers were employees of
publisher because publisher controlled means of distribution); National Freight, Inc., 146
N.L.R.B. 144, 146 (1964) (employment relationship existed between company and owner-
drivers because company controlled means by which drivers carried shipments); Golden
Age Dayton Corp., 124 N.L.R.B, 916, 918-19 (1959) (city distributors of product were
employees of company because company controlled manner and means of distribution opera-
tion); Albert Lea Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 817, 821-22 (1957) (salesmen were
employees of company, which controlled manner of conducting sales).
11 The Kansas City Star Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 384, 386-88 (1948) (one determining factor in
finding newspaper carriers independent contractors was that carriers set own hours).
-" La Prensa, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 527, 530-31 (1961) (free lance photographer was en-
trepreneur not wage-earner because newspaper paid fixed price per photograph rather than
salary); The Kansas City Star Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 384,388 (1948) (carriers who worked for profits
rather than wages or salary were independent contractors).
61 El Mundo, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 760, 761 (1967) (publisher forbade carriers to engage in
other business or to distribute publications other than employer's newspapers therefore
carriers not independent contractors); The Kansas City Star Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 384, 387 (1948)
(carriers were independent contractors because of freedom to engage in other commercial
activity or to work other jobs).
61 El Mundo, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 760, 761 (1967) (employer rather than employees bore
risks of business loss); The Kansas City Star Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 384, 386 (1948) (carriers were
independent contractors because they bore losses for papers stolen or damaged).
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dependent contractor depends largely on the facts of each case, and no
one factor is determinative.2 Additionally, the Supreme Court requires
appellate courts to give great deference to a Board determination of
employee status" in spite of congressional attempts to have the courts
review Board decisions." By limiting the Board's authority to narrow the
definition of independent contractor and thereby broaden the scope of
the Act's protections,65 Congress restricted NLRB discretion in the area
of independent contractors.6 The Board is now relegated to making fact-
ual determinations under the agency right to control test.' Because of
court deference to Board findings of fact,' however, the Board may
shape determinations of employee status to give protection to workers
the Board believes Congress intended the Act protect. Thus, Board
discretion in the area of independent contractors continues to exist in
spite of congressional attempts to limit the Board's power.6
Prior to the 1947 amendments to the Wagner Act, the NLRB and the
courts excluded independent contractors from coverage under the Act on
the basis of common-law doctrines and interpretations of congressional
intent."' Similarly, the Board and courts exclude managerial personnel
from the Act's definition of employee."' In cases decided soon after Con-
gress enacted the NLRA, the Board defined a managerial employee as
any executive who formulates management policy.7 Congress expressly
61 Golden Age Dayton Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 916, 918-19 (1959) (distributors found to be
employees); Albert Lea Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 817, 822 (1957) (salesmen held
employees).
6 See NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968). In United Insurance,
the NLRB examined conflicting facts and determined debit agents to be employees of the
company. Id. The Supreme Court insisted the courts give deference to the Board's factual
finding when the Board chose between two fairly conflicting views after hearing evidence to
support each view. Id.; see also supra note 5 (Board receives deference regarding determ-
inations of employee status).
" H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 18; see supra note 55 (Congress intended or-
dinary interpretations of language of Act).
" See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (exclusion of independent contractors
from Act coverage and mandate that Board use agency right to control test in determina-
tions of employee status).
" Id.
67 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (factors Board considers in applying
right to control test).
" See supra note 63 (deference to Board determinations of fact).
9 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (Board and Court based certain employee
status determinations on purpose of Act and workers Congress intended to protect).
70 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (congressional mandate to use right to
control test in determinations of employee status).
76 See supra text accompanying note 47 (independent contractors excluded from pro-
tection).
7 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); see supra text accompany-
ing note 14 (common-law exclusion of managerial employees).
11 Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946). The Board defined managerial
employees as executive personnel who determine and implement management policies. Id.
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excluded supervisors from the meaning of employee in the 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act" but never addressed the
status of managerial employees. Since the Board's practice of exclusion
adhered to the Act's purpose of promoting equal bargaining power,75
Congress apparently thought exclusion of managerial employees from
coverage obvious and statutory expression of the exclusion
unnecessary."8 The Board continued the practice of excluding managerial
employees from NLRA coverage until 1970.'
In 1970, the Board altered the policy of excluding all managerial
employees and decided that the NLRA excluded only managerial
employees whose work related to labor relations. 8 The Supreme Court,
The NLRB noted that the Board customarily excluded managerial employees from bargain-
ing units made up of rank-and-file workers. Id. In Ford Motor, the Board found that time-
study employees were specialized technical training were not managerial. Id.
"1 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 14-17; see also infra
text accompanying notes 90-91 (supervisor exclusion).
' 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see supra note 6 (purpose of Act was promotion of equal
bargaining power).
11 H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 16-17; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1947) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 105]; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
278-79 (1974) (discussion of congressional intent); R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 37. By stating
that supervisors were an extension of management and thus deserved exclusion from the
NLRA, both the House and Senate committees indicated Congress' belief that exclusion of
managerial employees was proper but that an express exclusion was unnecessary in light of
the Board's history of exclusion under the Wagner Act. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra, at 16; S.
REP. No. 105, supra, at 3.
See American Lithofold Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1062-63 (1954). In American
Lithofold, the NLRB excluded four employees from the bargaining unit because the Board
found the employees were managerial employees. Id. The Board excluded one of the four
because the employer's interests were more closely allied with management than with other
employees. Id. The Board excluded two of the employees because the workers were able to
bind the employer's credit. Id. The Board excluded the fourth employee, a man in charge of
production planning, because the employee made production decisions that affected the
price of the product, labor costs and the employer's profits. Id.; see also American
Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 117 (1950) (buyers were managerial employees because
employer authorized buyers to make substantial purchases on behalf of company); Palace
Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947) (store managers not managerial
because managers' interests not identical to company's interests); Denver Dry Goods Co., 74
N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947) (assistant buyers with interests more closely identified with
management than with employees in bargaining unit were managerial employees). Further-
more, as the Court noted in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974), courts
routinely approved the Board practice of excluding managerial employees. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Eec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970); Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902
(1969).
"' North Arkansas Elec. Coop., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1970), enforcement denied,
446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971). In North Arkansas, the NLRB indicated that the Board had
never articulated a precise definition of managerial employee. Id. at 550. The Board focused
attention on whether the employee had authority to speak for the employer in a labor rela-
tions context. Id. Although the employee in North Arkansas embodied several
characteristics of a managerial employee according to Ford Motor Co. standards, see supra
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however, rejected the policy change, citing congressional intent to ex-
clude all managerial employees from the purview of the Act.79 The Court
reinstated the Board's previous practice, determining that the exclusion
of managerial employees extends to all employees who determine and
implement management policies" or act as management representa-
tives, 81 as well as those who have interests aligned more closely with the
interests of management than with the interests of rank-and-file em-
ployees.2 With the Court's approval, the Board now adheres to the
original NLRB standard83 and determines managerial status by analyz-
ing whether the employee formulates and implements management
policies.u
note 73 and accompanying text, the Board found no evidence to suggest that the employee
formulated, determined, or implemented policies in the area of employee relations. Id. at
550-51. The Board thus held the individual to be an employee under the Act. Id. at 551; see
supra note 7 (Board ability to formulate and change policies).
11 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974); see supra note 76 and accom-
panying text (congressional intent). The Board had found Bell Aerospace buyers to be ap-
propriate members of a bargaining unit but the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the
Board order. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 273. The Supreme Court then held that the Act ex-
cludes all managerial employees, not just employees in positions related to labor relations.
Id. at 290.
1 See Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947) (store
managers held employees because interests not identical to management's interests).
81 See, e.g., Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 754 (1956) (procurement drivers who daily
bought produce from dealers, exercising independent judgment as to supplies, weight,
grades, and price of produce, were representatives of company and Board therefore excluded
drivers from bargaining unit); Denton's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35, 37 (1949) (Board excluded
buyers and assistant buyers who represented management in purchasing merchandise).
8 See, e.g., American Lithofold Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1062 (1954) (employees ex-
cluded as managerial because interest allied with management); American Locomotive Co.,
92 N.L.R.B. 115, 117 (1950) (buyers held managerial and excluded because made purchases
for company); see also supra note 77 (exclusion cases discussed).
" NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974). When an employee has the
power to pledge the employer's credit, the Board finds the employee is managerial. Weaver
Motors, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 209, 216 (1959). Another crucial factor indicating managerial
status is the ability of the employee to formulate policies for the employer. Wichita Eagle &
Beacon Publishing Co., 480 F.2d 52, 55-56 (10th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974).
But when the employee exercises discretion or independent judgment within the employer's
established guidelines, the employee is not a managerial employee. NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union Local 876, 570 F.2d 586, 592 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1978);
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 1715, 1717 (1958); Albert Lea
Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 817, 823 (1957). Two irrelevant factors are job title,
Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 290 n.19, and job seniority, Shayne Bros., Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 113,
114 (1974).
84 See, e.g., Retail Store Employees Union Local 876, 219 N.L.R.B. 1188, 1193-94 (1975)
(employee exercising independent judgment subject to review by superiors not managerial
employee), enforced, 570 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1978); Trans World Airlines, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B.
733, 734 (1974) (employees with responsibility for maintenance of food and souvenir supply
not managerial because actually supervised and lacked independent authority to formulate
prices).
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Congress intended the NLRA to equalize bargaining power between
labor and management. 5 The Board's exclusion of managerial employees
is appropriate in light of the Act's purpose since allowing coverage of
managerial employees would give unions inside information belonging to
management and an unfair advantage in bargaining." The courts properly
rejected departure from this policy 8 7 because the policy of exclusion had
a reasonable basis in the purpose of the NLRA.' The Board and courts
should continue to exclude managerial employees from the NLRA defini-
tion of employee even though Congress failed to enact the exclusion ex-
pressly."
Exclusion of managerial employees under the Act is analogous to
treatment of supervisors,90 whom the NLRA expressly excludes from
the definition of employee.9 Unlike managerial employees, however,
supervisors receive reinstatement when the Board finds certain unfair
labor practices.2 If the Board finds that termination of a supervisor in-
terfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of NLRA
organizational rights, the remedy the Board gives employees may result
in reinstatement of the supervisor.
Although supervisors are now excluded from NLRA protection, the
original Wagner Act definition of employee as any person who acts in an
- 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see supra note 6 (purpose of Act was promotion of equal
bargaining power).
" See supra notes 72-76 & 79-82 and accompanying text (exclusion of managerial
employees from NLRA protection); supra note 6 and accompanying text (purpose of Act).
See supra note 79 and accompanying text (Court rejection of Board policy change).
See supra note 7 (review of Board policies); see also supra note 6 (purpose of Act).
s See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (definition of employee).
® 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). The Act defines "supervisor" as a person with authority to
hire, transfer, suspend, promote, discharge, reward, or discipline employees on behalf of the
employer or with authority to direct employees in the work, hear grievances, and recom-
mend action. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Furthermore,
the supervisor's authority to act in the employer's interest must include authority to exer-
cise independent judgement. Id.; see Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: AnExplana-
tion of Inconsistent Results, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1713, 1714-18 (1981) (determinations of super-
visor status).
91 29 U.S.C. § 152(3 (1976) (exclusion of supervisor from NLRA definition of employee).
' Id. § 158(a)(1). If the Board finds that termination of a supervisor interfered with,
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of the right to organize, bargain collectively,
and engage in concerted activities, the supervisor's discharge constitutes an unfair labor
practice. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 106-12 (specific instances of supervisor
reinstatement).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see, e.g., Better Monkey Grip Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1170,1171
(1956), enforced, 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1957) (supervisor who testified against employer at
NLRB proceeding reinstated because inherent in employee rights is right to seek Board
resolution of dispute); Vail Mfg. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 181, 209 (1945), enforced, 158 F.2d 664 (7th
Cir. 1947) (supervisors reinstated when discharged for refusing to participate in unfair labor
practice against protected employees).
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) (supervisor defined).
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employer's interest 5 did not exclude supervisors expressly. 6 The Board
had difficulty determining the status of supervisory personnel under the
NLRA and reached confusing and often conflicting results when
deciding whether the Act applied to a particular individual. 7 In 1947 the
Supreme Court sustained an NLRB findingsthat the term employee in-
cluded supervisors, thereby resolving the .dfusion.9 In part as a reac-
tion to the Court's decision, Congress included in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments an explicit exclusion of supervisors from NLRA
protection.9 Congress, recognizing that supervisors are an extension of
management and that management has a right to expect the loyalty of
supervisors,"' intended that the Act exclude supervisors when super-
visors organize independently or along with rank-and-file employees.' °1
Amending the Act to exclude supervisors, Congress demonstrated a
belief that the Wagner Act had failed to promote equal bargaining be-
tween labor and management because the act protected employees at
the expense of management. ' Recognizing that when supervisors divide
"s Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1976)); see H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 13 (definition of employee).
Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1976)). Congress added section 152(11) defining supervisor in 1947 with the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 2(11),
61 Stat. 136, 138 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976)).
17 See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 76, at 4. In Packard Motor Car, the Board certified a
bargaining unit containing foremen, a decision which constituted the Board's second reversal
on the issue of whether the Act extended protection to supervisors. Packard Motor Car Co.,
61 N.L.R.B. 4, 26 (1945). Previous decisions had excluded supervisors. See, e.g., General
Motors Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457, 460 (1943); Murray Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 94, 95 (1943); Boeing
Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67, 70 (1943). The Board's original position had allowed certifica-
tion of bargaining units of foremen. See, e.g., Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 878-79
(1942); Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 963-64 (1942).
"' Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947). The Supreme Court
upheld the Packard Motor Car Board determination that foremen were properly in a
bargaining unit. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that if the legislature disagreed with in-
clusion of foremen in bargaining units, Congress should amend the NLRA to exclude super-
visors expressly. Id. at 493.
" H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 14.
101 H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 16-17; S. REP. No. 105, supra note 76, at 3. The
Senate report reflected the belief that supervisors were traditionally part of management
and that inclusion of supervisors in the collective bargaining procedure had undermined the
purpose of the NLRA. S. REP. No. 105, supra note 76, at 3-4. The Supreme Court has
recognized Congress' hope to eliminate a perceived imbalance in bargaining power that oc-
curred when inclusion in bargaining units placed supervisors in the position of serving two
masters, the union and management. Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1974).
"I H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 15. Representative Hartley wrote in the report
to the House version of the 1947 bill, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), that the con-
tinued productivity of American industry required exclusion of foremen from the operation
of the NLRA. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 4, at 15.
102 S. REP. No. 105, supra note 76, at 2. The Senate report to Senate bill 1126 explained
the labor committee's belief that the Wagner Act was inherently one-sided, affording pro-
tection to employees and unions while denying management relief for undesirable acts by
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loyalty between the union and the employer management no longer gets
fair representation in the collective bargaining setting,"' Congress pro-
vided that employers lawfully may refuse to bargain with unions whose
membership includes supervisors.' 4 Congress added the exclusion
without expressly prohibiting supervisors from organizing."s
In spite of congressional intent to exclude supervisory personnel
from the coverage of the NLRA, the Board has, with court approval,
created instances in which NLRB protection of employee rights results
in reinstatement of supervisors."6 When the Board finds an employer's
action toward a supervisor to be an unfair labor practice by infringing on
employee collective bargaining rights, the Board will vindicate the
rights of statutory employees and thereby protect the supervisor."7 The
Board allows reinstatement of supervisors discharged for testifying
against the employer in a Board proceeding"8 or during the processing of
organized labor. Id. Furthermore, Congress believed the NLRB's practice of including
supervisors in bargaining units, which the Court approved in Packard Motor Car, unduly
heightened the imbalance inherently present in the Act. Id.; see supra note 98 (Packard
upheld by Supreme Court).
113 H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 54, at 15.
10' See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). The NLRA does not require an employer to bargain
collectively with individuals defined as supervisors by the Act. National Labor Relations
Act § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976); Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653, 660 (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 245, supra note 54, at 16-17; see also Stop & Go Foods, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1078
(1979) (discharge of supervisor violates Act when discharge coerces employers and not
because NLRA protects concerted activity by supervisors); Long Beach Youth Center, Inc.,
230 N.L.R.B. 648, 650 (1977) (Act did not protect supervisor discharged for siding with
employees), enforced, 591 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1979).
"O 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). The Act provides that supervisors may join labor organiza-
tions. National Labor Relations Act § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976).
" See, e.g., Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1980) (supervisor
reinstated following discharge for refusing to enforce company's no-solicitation rule against
union); King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14, 20-21 (10th Cir. 1968) (Board reinstated
supervisors disciplined after testifying against employer in Board hearing); Pioneer Drilling
Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 918,923 (1967) (crew chiefs reinstated when discharge was pretext for term-
inating crews engaged in union activity), enforced, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968); see also
supra note 7 (Board authority to implement policies). The Board has protected supervisors
to the extent of granting reinstatement to supervisors discharged or demoted in violation of
employee rights under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). The Board, however, has not
given supervisors all the protections reserved for workers defined as employees by the
NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
" See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976); Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No.
58, -, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1290 (1982) (Board discussion of supervisor reinstatement);
Sheraton Puerto Rico Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 867, 868 (1980) (supervisor reinstated when
discharge threatened employee rights), enforcement denied, 651 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1981).
1' See, e.g., Better Monkey Grip Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1171 (1956), enforced, 243 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1957). In Better Monkey Grip, the Board ordered reinstatement of a supervisor
discharged for testifying against the employer's interests in an earlier unfair labor practice
proceeding. Id. at 1170-71. The Board held that the employer's action toward the supervisor
infringed on the right of statutory employees to pursue the remedies the NLRA
guarantees. Id. at 1171.
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an employee grievance. °9 The Board also allows reinstatement of super-
visors discharged for refusal to commit unfair labor practices.110 Addi-
tionally, Board practice allows redress when an employer disciplines a
supervisor for failure to prevent unionization."' The Board further
allows reinstatement when a supervisor warns a rank-and-file employee
that the employer is compiling a case for the employee's discharge."'
Although the courts have approved the exceptions providing limited
supervisor protection,"3 the NLRB recently restricted an area of protec-
tion the Board had long recognized." 4 Between 1947 and 1982, the Board
ordered reinstatement of supervisors whose discharges constituted an
"integral part" of the employer's overall plan to impede unionization and
interfere with employee rights."' In the 1982 decision of Parker-Robb
109 See, e.g., Rohr Indus., Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1039 (1975) (discharged supervisor
reinstated because termination resulted from supervisor's support of worker's grievance);
Ebasco Servs. Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 768, 770 (1970) (foremen reinstated following demotion for
giving statements unfavorable to employer during investigation of employee grievance com-
plaint).
"' See, e.g., Vail Mfg. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 181, 209 (1945), enforced, 158 F.2d 664 (7th Cir.
1947). In Vail Mfg., the employer attempted to classify shift supervisors as operators so the
supervisors would be eligible to vote against the union in a representation election. 61
N.L.R.B. at 207. When the supervisors refused the classification that would have con-
stituted an unfair labor practice, Vail discharged the supervisors. Id. at 209. The Board held
that Vail committed an unfair labor practice by termination of the supervisors. Id.; see 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (interference with exercise of employee organizational rights is un-
fair labor practice); see also Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 446 (1978) (Board reinstated
supervisor discharged for refusing to enforce no-solicitation rule), enforced, 614 F.2d 88 (5th
Cir. 1980); Inter-City Advertising Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1950) (Board reinstated supervisor
discharged for failing to report employees' union activities), rev'd, 190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.
1951).
Il See, e.g., Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 295 (1953), enforced, 213 F.2d
209 (5th Cir. 1954). In Talladega, overseers reluctantly interrogated employees about union
activities when the company ordered the overseers to break up the union. 106 N.L.R.B. at
296. Talladega discharged the overseers for failing to eliminate the union upon orders of the
employer. Id. The Board found that the Talladega officials and supervisors had engaged in
unfair labor practices and that discharge of the ineffective supervisors on the heels of union
victory at the plant demonstrated the employer's determination to thwart the union. Id. at
297. Thus, the Board found the company's action interfered with and coerced employees ex-
ercising organizational rights and constituted an unfair labor practice. Id.; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1976).
112 See, e.g., Buddies Super Mkts., 223 N.L.R.B. 950, 951 (1976), enforcement denied,
550 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1977). In Buddies, the employer discharged a supervisor for warning an
employee that the company was "building a case" against the employer. 223 N.L.R.B. at 950.
The Board held that the supervisor's discharge confirmed a pattern of patently unlawful
design by the employer and violated the Act. Id. The controlling factor was not that the
discharge served as an example to other supervisors who failed to cooperate in unlawful
conduct but that the supervisor's disclosure exposed the unlawful scheme and prevented a
discharge that would have violated the Act. Id.
See supra notes 107-12 (supervisor reinstatement).
See Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, __ , 110 L.R.R.M. 1289,
1289 (1982); see also infra notes 115, 116 (integral part cases and Parker-Robb holding).
"' Krebs & King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 462, 462 (1972); Pioneer Drilling Co., 162
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Chevrolet, Inc., the Board abruptly changed the policy and eliminated
the protection formerly afforded supervisors under the "integral part"
test."6
N.L.R.B. 918, 923 (1967), enforced, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968); Miami Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1361 (1963). The Board first articulated the phrase "integral part of a
pattern of conduct" in Miami Coca Cola. 140 N.L.R.B. at 1361. The company in Miami Coca
Cola fired a supervisor upon the supervisor's refusal to discharge all union activists. Id. at
1360. The Board found the supervisor's termination constituted an unfair labor practice
because the discharge was part of the employer's pattern of conduct designed to penalize
union adherents and eliminate union activity altogether. Id. at 1361.
The NLRB applied the Miami Coca Cola rationale to the facts of Pioneer Drilling and
found discharges of two drillers to violate the Act. 162 N.L.R.B. at 923. The dispute in the
Pioneer Drilling case arose when the company needed a crew in another location and re-
quested a transfer of two drillers, stipulated to be supervisors, whom the company knew to
be involved in union activity with the crews. Id. at 921. The Tenth Circuit noted that the
crew leaders' own union activities did not motivate the termination. 391 F.2d at 963. In-
stead, the employer's overall plan to stifle the crews' organization efforts motivated
discharge of the crew chiefs. Id. Concluding that the discharges violated the Act, the Board
noted two facts in particular. 162 N.L.R.B. at 923. The situation necessitating a crew
transfer had existed for over a week and the company sought transfers only when union ac-
tivity began among members of local crews. Id. Second, the company requested transfers
only of crews engaged in organizing efforts although a new and competent driller not engaged
in union activities was available. Id. at 924. Recognizing the industry custom by which a
driller selects his own crew and that termination of a driller constitutes termination of the
entire crew, the Board found that the employer committed an unfair labor practice when the
supervisors became a conduit for the employer's unlawful acts toward the rank-and-file
employees. Id. at 923.
The NLRB again affirmed the "integral part" or "conduit" rationale for finding a super-
visor's termination violative of the Act when the Board ordered reinstatement of a body
shop supervisor in Krebs & King Toyota. 197 N.L.R.B. at 463. In Krebs & King, the NLRB
held that the plan to squelch union activity violated the Act and ordered the shop and jobs
restored. Id.
The NLRB made the "integral part of a pattern of conduct" or "conduit" test the basis
for reinstatement of supervisors in a number of cases in which the supervisors terminated
supported the employees' efforts to organize. See, e.g., D.R.W. Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828, 829
(1980); Downslope Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 948, 949 (1979), enforced, 676 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir.
1982); Nevis Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054-55 (1979), enforced, 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1981); Donelson Packing Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1043 (1975), enforced, 569 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1978). In each case of reinstatement, the Board deemed termination of supervisors to be
part of the employer's design to eliminate the union from the workplace. See D.R. W., 248
N.L.R.B. at 829; Downslope, 246 N.L.R.B. at 949.
"' Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, -, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1290
(1982) (overruling D.R.W. Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980); Nevis Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B.
1053 (1979), enforced, 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981); Downslope Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 948
(1979), enforced, 676 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1982); Donelson Packing Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043
(1975), enforced, 561 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1978); VADA of Oklahoma, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 750
(1975); Fairview Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. 318, affd, 84 L.R.R.M. 3010 (5th Cir. 1973)).
The Parker-Robb decision did not, however, overrule Pioneer Drilling, 162 N.L.R.B. 918
(1967), enforced, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968), because the Board believed the Pioneer Drill-
ing situation unique in light of the unusual industry custom. Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at
- n.12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291 n.12; see supra note 98 (drilling industry custom whereby
discharge of driller terminates entire crew).
In Parker-Robb, two crew chiefs, admittedly supervisors, attended an organizational
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The Parker-Robb Board could not reconcile the long-standing "inte-
gral part" test with the statutory language of the NLRA."7 The Board
now views reinstatement of supervisors under the "integral part" test
as protection of supervisors rather than protection of employees' collec-
tive bargaining rights."' The Parker-Robb Board found that reinstate-
ment is acceptable only if a discharge interferes with employees' collec-
tive bargaining rights."' The Board's policy of reinstating supervisors
discharged for testifying in Board or grievance proceedings or for
similar reasons"' remains in effect, 2' but the Board no longer reinstates
supervisors through application of the "integral part" test."
meeting of union activists and learned that crew chiefs were ineligible for representation in
the unit. 262 N.L.R.B. at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1289. During the next day, the company
discharged several employees. Id. One of the crew chiefs sought an explanation from
management personnel, and a sales manager responded that the company had to cut back
its staff. Id. When the crew chief continued to demand an explanation, the manager fired
the crew chief. Id. The ALJ in Parker-Robb held that termination of the crew chief con-
stituted an integral part of the company's plan to discourage unionization. Id. The NLRB,
however, rejected the determination and eliminated the integral part test. Id. at 1290; see
supra note 4 (Board procedures).
The concurring NLRB member accepted the majority's refusal to reinstate the super-
visor but refused to join the Board decision retreating from the integral part test and over-
ruling the line of cases culminating in D.R. W. Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980). Parker-Robb,
262 N.L.R.B. at ___, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1294 (Jenkins, concurring); see infra note 124 (ra-
tionale of concurring opinion).
"I Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291. The
Parker-Robb majority asserted that the "integral part" or "pattern of conduct" line of cases
disregarded the Act's express exclusion of supervisors from the definition of employee. Id.
at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
"' Id. at ___ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291-92; see Downslope Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 948,
950 (1979) (Truesdale, concurring), enforced, 676 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1982); see also D.R.W.
Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828, 833 (1980) (Truesdale, dissenting).
119 Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
' See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (supervisors reinstated when
discharge interferes with exercise of employee rights under NLRA).
... Id. at ___ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1292; see Better Monkey Grip Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1170,
1171 (1956) (supervisor can testify against employer in Board proceeding without fear of
employer redress), enforced, 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1957); Vail Mfg. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 181, 209
(1945) (supervisor can refuse to commit unfair labor practice without repercussion), enforced,
158 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1947).
" See, e.g., Serendippity-Un-Ltd and Tigerrr, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 100, __ , 111
L.R.R.M. 1263, 1263 (1982) (discharge of supervisor who participated in strike was not unfair
labor practice and supervisor did not receive reinstatement); Boro Management Corp., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 56, __, 111 L.R.R.M. 1029, 1030 (1982) (employer who discharged super-
visor for attempting to enforce collective bargaining agreement did not violate Act even
though employer's action had incidental effect on protected employees); Rain-Ware, Inc., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 8, , 111 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1004 (1982) (supervisor's discharge not unlawful
when result of own participation in union activity); Roma Baking Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 4,
__ , 110 L.R.R.M. 1523, 1523 (1982) (supervisor discharged for union activity not
reinstated); Sahara-Reno Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 95, __ , 110 L.R.R.M. 1544, 1546-47
(1982) (chefs were supervisors whom Act did not protect); Master Food Servs., Inc., 262
N.L.R.B. No. 105, __, 110 L.R.R.M. 1389, 1390 (1982) (discharge of supervisor who signed
authorization card not unfair labor practice.
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The result of the earlier "integral part" decisions was to forbid any
activity that interfered with the protected class' exercise of statutory
rights.1" The effect of the current Board policy, however, is that any act
that does not interfere directly with employees' exercise of organiza-
tional rights does not violate the Act."' The NLRB no longer looks at the
employer's motivation or pattern of conduct." Instead, the Board deter-
mines if the specific act of the employer constitutes direct interference
with the rights of employees under the Act.'26 Absent direct in-
terference, the Board disregards any secondary effects employer con-
duct has on employees."
Exclusion of supervisors from the NLRA definition of employee is
appropriate in light of the congressional goal of equalizing bargaining
power between labor and management. 28 Management deserves the
loyalty of supervisors, and exclusion is necessary to maintain fairness
and equality in collective bargaining." But the policies of the NLRA also
warrant certain instances of reinstatement of supervisors."' When an
"2 See supra note 115 (Board ordered reinstatement when supervisor discharge in-
terfered with employee rights).
"2 Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1292; see
Downslope Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 948, 950 (1979) (Truesdale, concurring), enforced, 676
F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1982). The Board's new approach to the integral part cases makes the
employer's motivation for alleged misconduct irrelevant in a consideration of the legality of
the conduct. Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at -, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291. The concurring opin-
ion in Parker-Robb argued that the NLRB should consider the employer's motive for an act
before finding the conduct lawful. Id. at __ , 110 L.R.R.M. at 1295 (Jenkins, concurring).
Before Parker-Robb, the Board granted reinstatement when motivation for the discharge
was improper or when a legitimate business end did not outweigh reinstatement. Nevis
Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1055 (1979), enforced, 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981). The earlier
cases turned not on whether a supervisor engaged in union activities but on whether in-
volvement in and support of the union was the reason for the discharge. D.R.W. Corp., 248
N.L.R.B. 828, 829 (1980). If union participation was the reason for the discharge, the NLRB
found termination lawful. Id. at 829-30. If the Board found, however, that the employer's
desire to subvert organizational attempts by employees motivated the termination, the
discharge was unlawful. Id. at 830. Furthermore, instances existed in which an employer
discharged a supervisor personally engaged in union activities in violation of the Act. Id.
Because the employer directed the discharge at employees whose rights the Act protects,
the Board found that the employer had an unlawful motivation. Id. As the Parker-Robb con-
currence notes, the key to reinstatement decisions before Parker-Robb was the employer's
violation of rights of the protected class of employees. Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at -,
110 L.R.R.M. at 1295 (Jenkins, concurring).
' Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at ___, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
2 Id., 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
I?? Id., 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291. The Parker-Robb majority recognized that termination of
a supervisor almost always has a secondary effect on employees when the reason for term-
ination is the supervisor's own union activities or support. Id. However, the majority deter-
mined that a secondary effect on employees does not warrant affording protection to super-
visors under the Act. Id.
12 See supra note 6 (purpose of Act).
' See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (rationale of supervisor exclusion).
' See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (instances of supervisor reinstate-
ment).
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employer's discharge of a supervisor constitutes an unfair labor practice
by violating employee rights guaranteed by the Act,'3' supervisor
reinstatement is appropriate and necessary to vindicate employee
rights."' Since such protection of supervisors has a reasonable basis in
the provisions of the Act, the Board acts properly in granting reinstate-
ment." Because the Board receives deference in policy decisions, the re-
cent restriction on reinstatement under the integral part test should
withstand judicial scrutiny."u Although the change in policy may reflect
nothing more than a change in Board membership, future policies likely
will continue to depend on the political leaning of the Board majority."'
As long as formulations of policy have a basis in the Act, however, the
Board will continue to receive court deference unless Congress man-
dates a change in Board procedures. 3
Like NLRB treatment of managerial employees and supervisors, the
Board has formulated a policy toward confidential employees not ar-
ticulated by the NLRA itself but designed to further the policies
underlying the Act."7 The Board acknowledges that confidential
employees are employees by definition"8 but restricts the protection
confidential employees receive."9 Soon after passage of the Wagner Act,
"' See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976).
132 Id.; see supra notes 106-12 (supervisors reinstated when discharges constituted un-
fair labor practice against employees).
'" See supra note 7 (Board authorized to formulate policies to implement Act and
policies sustained when based on Act).
13 See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text (integral part cases).
13 See supra note 7 (policies may change with change in Board membership).
,36 Id. (courts defer to Board in formulations of policies designed to further the Act).
137 See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 171
(1981). Although confidential employees are employees within the Act's definition, see 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), the Board excludes confidential employees from bargaining units but
continues to provide other protections under the Act. Hendricks, 454 U.S. at 186 n.19; see,
e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1945); Southern Colorado Power Co., 13
N.L.R.B. 699 (1939), enforced, 111 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1940); see also supra note 7 (Board
authority to formulate policies). Confidential employees continue to receive protection from
discrimination in hiring, tenure, or discharge, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), protection of right
to strike, Id. § 163, and access to the Act's resolution and enforcement procedures. See id.
§ 160.
"' See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (employee definition). The Supreme Court recently
defined a confidential employee as an employee who assists or acts in a confidential capacity
to an individual exercising a managerial function in the field of labor relations. NLRB v.
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 184 (1981); see Ford Motor
Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) (Board limited confidential capacity to field of labor rela-
tions).
35 See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 179-80
n.11 (1981). Just as the Board held managerial employees to be outside the intended scope of
the NLRA definition after NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974), the Board
found confidential employees to be outside the class appropriately belonging to bargaining
units. See Hendricks, 454 U.S. at 179-80 n.11; see also supra note 7 (Board power to create
policies); notes 72-89 (managerial employees excluded).
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the Board confronted the contention that the NLRA definition of
employee excluded all employees with access to confidential information
of the employer. " ' The Board rejected exclusion of confidential
employees, finding that Congress intended to extend coverage of the
Act to confidential employees.' Rather than exclude confidential
employees altogether, however, the Board adopted a labor-nexus ra-
tionale and excluded from bargaining units employees with confidential
information relating to the employer's labor relations policies.' The
labor-nexus rationale was similar to Congress' rationale in excluding
supervisors.' The Board reasoned that the Act should not require
management to bargain with units whose membership included
employees who in the course of employment obtain confidential informa-
tion about the employer's intended actions toward the union.' The
Board routinely applied the labor-nexus test " 5 to determine which
employees to exclude from bargaining units.'
14 See Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108 (1941) (stenographer with confiden-
tial information regarding labor relations excluded while fifteen other employees with con-
fidential information not related to labor relations included in bargaining units); Bull Dog
Elec. Prod. Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 1043 (employees in engineering department included in bargain-
ing units), dismissed, 25 N.L.R.B. 345 (1940).
' See supra note 140 (confidential employees given "employee" protection under
NLRA).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). Broad discretion is vested in the Board to determine ap-
propriate bargaining units. See id.; supra note 4 (Board's determination of bargaining units).
The NLRB has formulated policies in which certain individuals receive special treatment.
Groups other than confidential employees excluded from bargaining units for policy reasons
include relatives of management personnel, clerical employees, and technical employees. 1
J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 3.67 (1968). In Brooklyn Daily Eagle, the Board held that
secretaries to the managing editor and editor of the newspaper were confidential
employees. 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939). Because management should not have to allow
members of the unit to handle confidential management materials, the Board excluded the
secretaries from the bargaining unit. Id.
'4 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (congressional intent to exclude
supervisors).
1' See The Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944) (employees who prepared reports
based on confidential instructions regarding employees' overtime allowances and wage ad-
justment, handled correspondence between members of management and supervisors, and
prepared and handled reports arising from employee grievance investigations were con-
fidential employees excluded from the proposed bargaining unit).
"I See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1234-36 (1945); South Bend Lathe
Works, 59 N.L.R.B. 562, 564 (1944); Colonial Broach Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 846, 848 (1943); Bendix
Prod. Div., 43 N.L.R.B. 912, 915-16 (1942); see also NLRB v. Hendricks County Elec.
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 179-80 n.11 (1981). The Board modified the labor-nexus test
in 1946 when in Ford Motor Co. the Board limited the confidential capacity to one who exer-
cises a managerial function in labor relations. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1327 (1946).
14 See, e.g., Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 487, 488-89 (1946) (employees per-
forming no confidential functions related to labor relations not excluded); Tennessee Gas &
Transmission Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1379 (1946) (employees who had function in grievance
proceedings excluded from unit); St. Louis Indep. Packing Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 543, 547 (1946)
(clerks not excluded as confidential personnel when no duties related to labor relations).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Congress amended the Wagner Act definition of employee in 1947
but did not exclude confidential employees from the meaning of
employee.117 As the Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. Hendricks County
Rural Electric Membership Corp.,4 ' the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley amendments reveal that Congress intended to leave the Board's
practice intact. 49 In Hendricks, the Supreme Court rejected earlier
Court dictum that alluded to congressional intent to exclude confidential
employees from NLRA coverage 5 ' and found that Congress intended to
allow the Board to continue the practice of excluding only confidential
employees with a labor nexus."' The Board has continued to apply the
labor-nexus test to distinguish between confidential employees and
employees rightfully within the scope of a bargaining unit."2
An important question the Hendricks Court left undecided is
whether the NLRB practice of affording protection to confidential
employees while excluding them from bargaining units is proper."' But
Courts upheld Board decisions excluding confidential employees with labor connection from
bargaining units. See NLRB v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 138 F.2d 204, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1943)
(court held Board properly found office workers with no confidential information about labor
relations belonged in bargaining unit).
... Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)).
"a 454 U.S. 170, 186 (1981). In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that a confidential
employee is an employee who acts in a confidential capacity to an individual functioning on
behalf of management in the field of labor relations. Id. at 181. The case involved two
separate fact situations. In one situation, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and
upheld the Board's finding that the personal secretary to the company's general manager
was not a confidential employee because she had no confidential duties related to labor
policies. Id. at 191. The Court also rejected exclusion of eighteen employees of another com-
pany as confidential employees when none of the employees satisfied the labor-nexus test.
Id.
149 Id. The Court stated that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments
provided no indication that Congress disapproved of Board application of the labor-nexus
test to confidential employees. Id.; see supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (labor-
nexus rationale).
15 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 187-88
(1981). In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 267 (1974), a case involving managerial
employees, the Court stated that Congress clearly thought the NLRA did not cover con-
fidential employees. 416 U.S. at 284 n.12. But the Hendricks Court held that the Bell
Aerospace Court had misinterpreted committee reports. Hendricks, 454 U.S. at 186. In fact,
the Hendricks Court found that Congress knew of the Board's labor-nexus test and made no
move to direct a new procedure. Id. at 187-88 n.20.
"' NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 187-88
(1981). The Court affirmed the Board practice of excluding as confidential employees only
employees involved in labor relations, personnel, and hiring functions. Id.
" See, e.g., Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 253 N.L.R.B. 447, 448-49 (1980) (non-
confidential clerical staff employees of law firm excluded from bargaining units where
employees not privy to confidential information about labor policies of employer); Swank,
Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 96, 98 (1977) (personnel assistant and personnel department receptionist
excluded from bargaining units as confidential employees).
"I See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 185-86
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in light of the deference the courts give the Board in identifying ap-
propriate bargaining units"M and the deference courts give to Board
policies when the policies have a reasonable basis in the Act, -" the Board
practice should withstand challenge. Furthermore, in view of the Hend-
ricks Court's finding that Congress knew of the Board practice and made
no effort to alter it by legislation,5 ' the practice probably will continue
and confidential employees will remain statutory employees receiving
all the protections of the Act except inclusion in bargaining units. 157
The NLRB makes determinations of employee status to afford the
protections of the NLRA to persons deserving protection. The Board
decides if a person is an agricultural laborer,' 58 an independent contrac-
tor, 59 or a managerial employee." If a worker falls into one of these
categories, the Board excludes the worker from coverage.'' Further-
more, if a person is a supervisor, the Act precludes supervisor protec-
tion62 unless the Board finds that the employer's conduct constituted an
unfair labor practice and that supervisor reinstatement is necessary to
vindicate employee rights." Congress gave the NLRB authority to im-
plement the Act,"' and the courts have granted the Board broad discre-
tion to formulate policies to further the purposes of the Act.'65 The Board
acts within its discretionary power in interpreting the agricultural
laborer and independent contractor exclusions narrowly to give a
greater number of workers protection under the Act.'66 Since the Act's
avowed purpose is to promote collective bargaining, the Board properly
extends NLRA protection to workers whom the Board believes Con-
n.19. The Hendricks Court found that the questioned employees were not confidential
employees under the labor-nexus test. Id. at 186. The Court, therefore, did not decide
whether the Board's practice of partial exclusion is acceptable. Id. at 185-86 n.19.
1 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947) (Court deferred to
Board determination that bargaining unit should include foremen); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 152 (1941) (Court upheld Board's determination of unit comprised
of production and maintenance employees); see supra note 5 (court review).
" See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968); see supra notes 7, 56 and ac-
companying text (deference to Board).
5 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 187-88 n.20
(1981).
151 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (confidential employees excluded
from bargaining units).
" See supra notes 19-45 and accompanying text (agricultural laborers).
,' See supra notes 46-70 and accompanying text (independent contractors).
"6 See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text (managerial employees).
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see supra note 3 (definition of employee); see also supra
notes 72-89 and accompanying text (managerial exclusion).
.6. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (supervisors excluded from Act coverage).
-- 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (unfair labor practice defined); see supra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text (supervisors reinstated when necessary to protect employee rights).
u 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159 (1976); see supra note 4 (NLRB implements Act).
" See supra note 7 (Board authority to implement NLRA policies).
'" See supra notes 19-70 and accompanying text (agricultural laborers and independent
contractors).
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gress intended the Act to help.8 ' The courts police the Board's policy-
making function and restrict application of policies that the courts
believe overreach the purpose of the NLRA. 8 The Board has arrived at
policies for treatment of managerial employees and supervisors that ap-
pear to promote the purposes of the Act.'69 Both groups are excluded
from NLRA protection in fairness to management and in an effort to in-
sure equality of bargaining power between labor and management.'
The Board gives limited protection to certain supervisors when
reinstatement is the proper remedy for an employer's unfair labor prac-
tice, but the Board refuses to give outright protection to supervisors
who wish to engage in concerted employee activity. 7 ' In this manner the
Board furthers the Act's goal of protecting employees' rights to organize
and bargain collectively without destroying management's ability to
maintain a loyal management staff.'' Similarly, the Board excepts con-
fidential employees from bargaining units of rank-and-file employees to
assure that management is able to prevent union access to confidential
labor relations information.1 13 Although -courts have not ruled on the
validity of the Board's practice, the exclusion appears warranted by the
Act's purpose of equalizing bargaining power.74 In light of the apparent
basis in the Act's goals, the NLRB policy of excluding confidential
employees with a connection to labor matters from rank-and-file bargain-
ing units appears proper.7 5
Congress gave the NLRB broad power to enforce the NLRA and for-
mulate policies necessary to administer the Act. 8 When Board policies
have a reasonable basis in the Act's avowed purpose of promoting collec-
tive bargaining in labor relations and insuring employee organizational
rights,'77 the Supreme Court requires that reviewing courts defer to
Board formulations of policies.' As long as the Board bases determina-
I5 !d.
16 See supra notes 7, 78-79 (Board formulates policies but courts may reject policies
that overreach purposes of Act).
169 See supra notes 71-127 and accompanying text (managerial employees and super-
visors).
171 See supra notes 72-77 (congressional intent to exclude managerial employees and
supervisors).
171 See supra note 104 (supervisors excluded from protection).
171 See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (supervisors reinstated only when
necessary to vindicate employee rights).
17 See supra notes 153-56 (confidential employees excluded from bargaining units).
171 See supra notes 6, 7 (Board authorized to make policies in furtherance of purposes of
NLRA).
171 See supra notes 153-56 (confidential employees excluded in fairness to management);
supra note 7 (Board authority to formulate policies); supra note 6 (purpose of Act is promo-
tion of equal bargaining power).
176 See supra note 7 (NLRB procedures and powers).
17 See supra note 6 (purpose of Act).
18"See supra note 7 (deference to Board policies).
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tions in the areas of agricultural laborers, "9 independent contractors,'80
izanagerial employees,' 8' supervisors,'8' and confidential employees' on
policies designed to further NLRA goals,' NLRB policies likely will
withstand challenge in spite of changes in policy which changes in Board
membership often cause.'85 Unless Congress mandates a new procedure
for implementing the NLRA, the Board will continue to regulate the
field of labor relations while receiving deference from reviewing
courts.'6
KATHERINE CARRUTH LINK
. See supra notes 19-45 and accompanying text (agricultural laborers).
' See supra notes 46-70 and accompanying text (independent contractors).
... See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text (managerial employees).
8 See supra notes 90-136 and accompanying text (supervisors).
183 See supra notes 137-57 and accompanying text (confidential employees).
' See supra note 6 (purpose of Act).
'as See supra note 7 (makeup of Board and membership changes resulting in policy
changes).
"8 See id. (deference to Board policies).
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